Currencies

Highlights The great political surprises of 2016 are approaching key deadlines on November 3 and December 31. Investors should not let Brexit take their eye off the US election. Globalization will retreat faster under Trump regardless of what happens in the United Kingdom. The market is starting to price several clear risks: a failure to extend fiscal relief in the US (25% chance); a surprise Trump tariff move (40%); a contested election (20%); or a failure of the UK and EU to seal a deal (35%). Trump is unlikely to pull off a landslide like Boris Johnson in December 2019. The backdrop has darkened and Biden is an acceptable alternative for voters, unlike Jeremy Corbyn. Go long GBP-USD at the 1.25 mark; go long GBP-EUR volatility. Feature The end game is approaching for the two great political shocks of 2016 – Brexit and Trump. November 3 is the US election and December 31 is the deadline for an UK-EU trade deal. Investor sentiment is starting to show some cracks for various reasons, some technical (Chart 1). But we do not believe near-term volatility and risk-off sentiment have fully run their course yet. Either the US election cycle or the UK’s brinkmanship with the EU, or both, will agitate markets as the deadlines approach. The former is a much weightier factor. Chart 1Market Starts To Price Bevy Of Near-Term Risks ... But Cyclical View Still Constructive The risks in play are a failure to extend fiscal relief in the US (25% chance); a conflict between Trump and one of America’s foreign rivals such as China, whether due to Trump’s reelection or lame duck status (40%); a contested election (20%); or a failure of the UK and EU to seal a deal, setting back their economic recovery (35%). Maybe all of these risks will dissipate by mid-November, but maybe not. The market has not discounted any of them fully. So investors should buy insurance now. Vox Populi Is The Biggest Constraint For global investors Brexit is far less consequential than President Trump’s “America First” policy but the UK does punch above its economic weight in financial markets (Chart 2). Chart 2Brexit: Why Should We Care? UK Punches Above Its Economic Weight In Financial Markets Geopolitical analysis teaches that limitations on policymakers should be the starting point of analysis. For democracies, the biggest constraint of all is the vox populi – the voice of the people, or popular will. The Brexit movement faced a vociferous “Resistance” that won over the media and financial market consensus until reality struck in the general election of December 12, in which the Conservative Party won a historic victory. Chart 3Joe Biden Is Not Jeremy Corbyn The election vindicated Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s brinkmanship and “hard Brexit” terms, while once again chastening the elites and experts – including an innovative Supreme Court. Johnson’s single-party majority, combined with COVID-19 and the surge in domestic economic stimulus, have increased the odds that the UK will choose sovereignty over the economy and walk away from trade talks. Trump’s supporters show the same enthusiasm as Brexiteers and the same scorn for conventional wisdom and opinion polls. Will they be similarly vindicated? Beyond any knee-jerk equity rally, that would entail a “Phase Two” trade war with China – and possibly a new trade war with Europe or a global trade war. However, Trump faces much worse odds than Boris Johnson did. First, Johnson’s snap election took place at the top of the business cycle, back when a novel coronavirus was just starting to be discovered in Wuhan, China. This is how Harry Truman won his surprise victory in 1948, in defiance of all the opinion polls. Had Truman run in 1949, after a deep recession, the story would have gone differently – which is a problem for both Trump and the near-term equity market. Second, the political alternative was not acceptable in the United Kingdom but it is in the United States. Johnson led Jeremy Corbyn, a far-left rival for the premiership, by around 15%-20% in the polls. The Conservative Party itself led the Labour Party by 10%. By contrast, former Vice President Joe Biden is a center-left Democrat who has many flaws but is not out of the mainstream. He leads President Trump in the polling, as do Democrats over Republicans, though only by single digits. There is no contest between Biden and Corbyn (Chart 3). Trump might still win, but an American version of the UK landslide in 2019 is unlikely. Trump will lose the popular vote even if he wins the Electoral College, and Republicans have a very slim chance of winning the House of Representatives. The implication for financial markets is doubly negative, at least in the near term: there is about a 35% chance that the UK will leave without a deal and about a 35% chance that Trump will win. He could also kick China in the interim period if he loses. Won’t stocks cheer a Trump comeback and victory? Perhaps, but a data-dependent approach suggests that a “blue sweep” is still the base case, and that would be a good trigger for a full equity correction. Nor would a Trump win be positive for long-term equity returns in the final analysis. Trump is reflationary, but a larger trade war would hamper the global economic recovery and thus keep earnings suppressed. There is a 35% chance that Trump will win re-election. Trump is unlikely to win the national vox populi, like Brexit did, but he obviously can win the popular vote in the critical regions – the Sun Belt and the Rust Belt. If he does, the revolution in the global system will be confirmed: the retreat of globalization will accelerate. If he does not, then Brexit alone cannot confirm de-globalization; rather the UK will face even more pressure to make concessions and get a trade deal. Trump’s Path To Victory Chart 4Sitting Presidents Win Half The Time If Recession Ends In H1 We may well be forced to upgrade Trump’s odds of winning if his comeback gains momentum. Our subjective odds of a Trump win come from the historical record – incumbent parties only retain the White House amid recessions five out of 13 times in American history – but there are some important exceptions. First, the longest-serving American president, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, served during the Great Depression. So obviously a bad economy does not always disqualify a president. Nevertheless FDR got lucky with the timing of the fluctuations and he was personally popular, unlike President Trump. Second, an incumbent president wins 50% of the time if the recession ends before the election – namely in 1900, 1904, and 1924 (contrasted with defeats in 1888, 1912, and 1980). Today’s market performance looks similar to these cases, though premature fiscal tightening is now jeopardizing Trump’s bid (Chart 4). Assuming new stimulus passes, it is extremely beneficial for President Trump that COVID-19 cases are subsiding (Chart 5). Chart 5COVID-19 Subsides In Nick Of Time For Trump? Chart 6Even Approval Of Trump’s Pandemic Response Improving His approval rating on handling COVID-19 is somewhat recovering at the moment (Chart 6). Trump’s “law and order” message is also benefiting him amid the rise in vandalism, rioting, and homicide, judging by his improvement in national approval rating across almost all demographic groups, including many that are otherwise averse to Trump. Finally, Trump’s Abraham Accords – a potentially major peace deal between Israel and an expanding list of Arab states – could give his image another boost (Table 1). Foreign policy will not decide the election but these peace deals should not be underrated because they underscore a more important argument for voters: that the US should withdraw from its endless foreign wars and pursue peace and prosperity instead. If Trump’s typically weak approval rating on foreign policy starts to rise then his comeback gains breadth. Table 1The Abraham Accords Give Boost To Trump Image As Peacemaker We will upgrade our 35% odds of Trump’s re-election if Congress passes a new fiscal relief package, assuming Trump’s polling continues to improve. Our quantitative model is now giving Trump a 45% chance, which is in line with the consensus view but well above our subjective odds (Chart 7). We will upgrade our view if Congress passes a new fiscal relief package, assuming Trump’s polling continues to improve. Chart 7Quantitative US Election Model Puts Trump Win At 45% Odds Chart 8Stimulus Hiccups Cause Market To Sell The stock market does not perform well during periods in which fiscal cliff negotiations are prolonged – the failure of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in 2008 is one thing, but today’s impasse is more reminiscent of the debt ceiling crises of 2011 and 2013. Trump is now directly pressuring Senate Republicans to capitulate to House Democratic spending demands. If Republican senators abandon him, market turmoil will undercut his argument that he is the best man to revive the economy and he will lose the election (Chart 8). We do not think they will – and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s pledge to keep the House in session until a deal is passed is very positive news – but until the deal is sealed the market is vulnerable. As mentioned above we give a 25% chance of a failure to pass any stimulus bill in September or October. The next chance for stimulus will be in late January or February. Trump stands for growth at all costs, which will be received well by equity markets, other things being equal. But a Trump victory implies more trade war and that the GOP will retain the Senate, creating a steeper fiscal cliff next year – so any relief rally will be short-lived. Meanwhile a Trump defeat raises the risk he will take aggressive actions on the way out to cement his legacy as the Man Who Confronted China, and bind the Biden administration to decoupling policy. This is not a favorable outlook for investor sentiment or the economic recovery over the next few months. Brexit: The Three Kingdoms Will Force A Trade Deal Chart 9Sterling Will Fall Before It Bounces Back On A Deal In December 2016 we pointed to the three kingdoms – England, Ireland, and Scotland – as the origin of the geopolitical and constitutional crisis that would arise from the Brexit referendum and act as a powerful bar against a no-deal Brexit. That framework remains salient today as the risk of no-deal escalates due to quarrels over Northern Ireland Protocol, which was agreed in October 2019 as part of the formal Withdrawal Agreement that made Brexit happen on January 31, 2020. The implication is that the pound has not bottomed yet, though we see a buying opportunity around the corner (Chart 9). No one should doubt that the UK could walk away from the EU without a deal this December: The Tories’ single-party majority gives them the raw capability to push through plans they decide on – and raises the risk that they will overreach. The tariff shock of a no-deal exit is frequently exaggerated. The UK would suffer a tariff shock of about 1.38% of GDP, larger than what the US suffered in its tariff-war with China but hardly a death knell (Table 2). (The costs of losing single-market access would grow over time, however.) Table 2A No-Trade-Deal Brexit Would Create A Minimum Tariff Shock Of 1.4% Of GDP COVID-19 has supplanted the worst-case outcome of a no-deal exit by producing a much worse recession than anyone feared. The US is using the disruption to decouple from China and the UK could do the same with the EU. The result of COVID-19 is massive domestic stimulus that raises the UK’s and Europe’s threshold for pain. Any failure of trade talks would spur more stimulus. The Bank of England still has some bond-buying ammunition left and parliament, again, is undivided. Given that Boris Johnson has until 2024 before the next election, there is theoretically time for his personal and party approval ratings to improve as the economy recovers from the pandemic and any messy Brexit (Chart 10). Chart 10Bojo Has Until 2024 To Recover From Crises Chart 11UK Would Face WTO-Level Tariffs If No Deal The UK’s position in the quarrel over Ireland is rational – but so is the EU’s. If the trade talks collapse, the UK will need to remove any regulatory or customs divisions with Northern Ireland. Yet in preparing to do so it vitiates trust with the EU and makes a trade deal less likely. However, weighing all these points up, an UK-EU trade deal is still the most likely outcome (65% chance), as the economic and political costs are crystal clear while the benefits of a hard break are not so clear. Allow us to explain. Northern Ireland is the latest cause of tensions, although it was inevitable that tensions would arise ahead of the end-of-year deadline for a trade deal. Westminster has proposed an Internal Market Bill, which has passed with solid majorities in two readings in parliament, to reclaim aspects of sovereignty over Northern Ireland that were traded away to clinch the Withdrawal Agreement last year. The Johnson government’s position should be seen as a negotiating tactic to build leverage in the talks but also as a real fallback position if the talks fail. The House of Lords could delay the bill by a year, meaning that it may not take effect until end of 2021 – but a trade deal would make it moot. The Northern Ireland Protocol solved the riddle of how to preserve the integrity of the EU’s single market after Brexit yet avoid a return to a hard customs border with the Republic of Ireland. Customs checks were removed with the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement in 1998, which ended the Troubles between the two Irelands. The Protocol introduces a pseudo-customs border on the Irish Sea, requiring declarations on exports to Great Britain and EU oversight of UK state aid for Northern Irish firms, so that Northern Ireland can stay in the EU customs area while the UK can leave and still preserve a semblance of its own customs area in Northern Ireland. If the UK and EU get a trade deal, then all trade is tariff-free and the Protocol becomes redundant. Also, the Protocol enables a Joint Committee to review disputes over exports to Northern Ireland that are “at risk” of making their way into the EU without duties. The Protocol is supposed to operate even if the UK and EU fail to get a trade deal. Yet it is politically untenable for the UK to subject trade within its own country to EU rules or duties, or allow the EU to supervise state corporate subsidies across the UK, if no deal is agreed. The UK is more likely to violate the treaty to preserve its internal integrity. As Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis admitted, “Yes, this [Internal Market Bill] does break international law in a very specific and limited way.” While the EU’s threat to slap tariffs on British food exports to Northern Ireland is the proximate trigger of the Internal Market Bill, another key reason for the UK’s aggressive shift is the issue of state aid. All governments are extending emergency aid to major corporations to keep them from insolvency amid the recession. This will be the case for some time and it is even more true of the EU than of the United Kingdom. However, under the Protocol, the EU would be able to penalize companies in Great Britain that receive subsidies if goods or firms in Northern Ireland can be shown to benefit. Northern Ireland is supposed to operate within the EU’s standards on state aid. London obviously bristles at this backdoor for letting in EU regulation, not least because, in the event that a trade deal is not reached, it will need to pump the country full of state aid to compensate for the shock of seeing exports to the EU rise by 3% across the board according to Most Favored Nation status under the World Trade Organization (Chart 11). An UK-EU trade deal is the most likely outcome. As Dhaval Joshi of BCA’s European Investment Strategy points out, Boris needs to keep his own Tories under his heel (Chart 12). The Internal Market Bill provoked a backlash among 30 moderates. If that number rises to 40 Johnson loses his majority. This is a problem that he is seeking to address by giving parliament a veto over any future uses of the bill that would violate international law (this is an acceptable compromise because he has a majority). But a failure to drive a hard bargain with the EU would cause a much bigger rebellion among hard Brexit Conservative MPs and threaten his job. Chart 12Bojo Must Balance Hard Brexit Tories Geopolitics is about might, not right – the UK can assert its sovereignty and violate these international agreements, while the EU can then apply punitive tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and sanctions under the Withdrawal Agreement. Brexit is a power-political struggle that could devolve into a trade war. Obviously that would be a very bad outcome for the market, particularly for the UK, which is overmatched (Chart 13). But this risk is also a key limitation on the UK that will prevent this worst-case outcome. Indeed, despite all of the above, our base case is still that the UK and EU will get a deal. First, the economy will clearly suffer without a deal. After all, the US-China tariffs produced a negative effect for these two economies in 2019 and the impact on the UK would be bigger than that on the US (Chart 14). Chart 13The Brick Wall The UK Cannot Avoid Chart 14UK Faces Trade Shock If No Deal Second, the public doesn’t support a no-deal exit (Chart 15). Northern Ireland itself voted against Brexit in the referendum and as such would rather see an agreement that groups the UK and the EU under a single zero-tariff free trade agreement. Third, Boris faces a rebellion in Scotland if he pursues a hard break. The Scottish National Party would revive ahead of Scottish elections in May 2021 and demand a second independence referendum (Chart 16). The Irish Sea is a natural division that makes a more intrusive customs presence more supportable than otherwise. A little more paperwork is an acceptable cost to keep the United Kingdom from falling apart. Scotland is much more likely to go independent than Ireland is to unite. Chart 15Only 25% Think 'No Deal' A Good Outcome Boris is now prime minister, not just party leader, and he will ultimately have to decide whether he wants to be the last prime minister of a United Kingdom. Assuming Boris is at least focused on the next election, he will have to decide if he wants the rest of his premiership to be consumed with a self-inflicted double-dip recession and democratic revolt in Scotland, or a recovery on the back of a functional if uninspiring trade deal enabling him to head off the Scottish threat and save the union. Chart 16No Deal' Would Boost Scottish Independence Movement Obviously the final deal may not be clinched until the eleventh hour. The October 15 deadline can be delayed but talks must conclude in November or December in time to be ratified by the EU member states by December 31. US Election Drives Geopolitics, But Not The Brexit Outcome One factor that will not play much of a role in the UK’s decision-making is the US election. It is true that the Johnson government would benefit from President Trump’s reelection. But the EU is a much bigger market for the UK and the UK’s best strategy is to focus on its national interest regardless of what the US does. The US election may not be decided in mid-December in time for the UK to agree to a deal that can be ratified by year’s end anyway. Moreover the UK’s best strategy is to conclude a deal with the EU first, and then pursue a deal with the United States. This is because President Trump will be inclined to sign at least an executive deal, while a congressional deal requires support from the Democrats, which is only possible if Northern Ireland is resolved without hard border checks. Because the EU makes up such a larger share of British trade, an American deal does not give the UK much leverage in negotiating with the EU, but an EU deal does give the UK greater leverage in negotiating with the US. As Diagrams 1 and 2 show, this strategic logic holds even if the UK knows the outcome of the US election ahead of time: the scenarios with the least benefit and the greatest cost would still be scenarios involving no deal with the European Union. Diagrams 1 & 2United Kingdom Wants An EU Trade Deal (Regardless Of Trump/Biden) Diagram 3 boils all of this down to a single decision tree. First, the diagram shows that the economic costs are not prohibitive and therefore the risk of a no-deal exit is substantial – we would say 35%. Second, it shows that the risks of the negotiation are skewed to the downside. Third, it highlights that the UK will settle its affairs directly with the EU and not hinge its actions on the US election cycle. Diagram 3No-Deal Brexit Cost Not Prohibitive, But Best Strategy Is To Get A Deal Clearly the best strategy and best outcome involve seeking a trade deal with the EU, and hence it is our base case. This means an opportunity to buy the pound and domestic-oriented British equities, and turn neutral on gilts, is just around the corner. Investment Takeaways The GBP-EUR is the best measure of the market’s sensitivity to Brexit risks, so it should fall in the near term and rally sharply after resolution. However, the US election complicates things. The euro’s response is fairly binary: it is one of the biggest winners if Biden wins and one of the biggest losers if Trump wins. Hence GBP-EUR volatility will rise in the coming months (Chart 17). We recommend going long 1-month implied volatility contracts for October and November. The pound sterling, by contrast, will ultimately rise regardless of US election result, since the UK will pursue a trade deal out of its own national interest. Trump is less negative for the US dollar than Biden and a comeback and victory will drive a counter-trend dollar bounce. However, in the medium term we expect the dollar to fall regardless due to debt monetization and global growth recovery. Thus we recommend going long GBP-USD on a strategic basis when political risks peak over the next two-to-three months and GBP-USD falls to around 1.25, as recommended by our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor (Chart 18). Chart 17EUR-GBP Volatility Will Rise Sterling bears are forgetting that the sound defeat of Corbyn ruled out a sharp left-wing turn in domestic economic policy (higher taxes), while the Tories have made a clear turn against fiscal austerity. Therefore the worst-case scenario is a failure to agree to a trade deal by the end of this year. But that is not the base case and the risk will be priced within a month or two. Chart 18Pound Will Rally After Deal Concluded In November Or December Chart 19Yes, China Is Opening The Taps We remain tactically cautious and defensive even though the US fiscal negotiations are improving. The market is underrating too many clear and concrete risks to sentiment and the corporate earnings outlook, so the current bout of volatility can continue until there is greater clarity on US fiscal spending, the US election cycle, associated geopolitical risks, and the Brexit showdown. Book gains on long Brent trade for a return of 69.7%. We initiated this trade on March 27 in our “No Depression” report, which marked our shift to a strategic risk-on positioning. We remain bullish on oil prices and commodities on the back of global stimulus and our assessment that the OPEC 3.0 cartel will maintain discipline overall, but the next three-to-six months are crowded with downside risk. Cyclically, we see a global economic recovery deepening and broadening. China’s stimulus is surprising to the upside, as we have long written and the latest credit numbers bear this view out (Chart 19), which is critical for global reflation.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com

Highlights We remain bearish on the US dollar over the next 12 months. The best vehicle to express this view continues to be the Scandinavian currencies (NOK and SEK). Precious metals remain a buy so long as the dollar faces downside. However, we remain more bullish on silver than gold. Go short the gold/silver ratio (GSR) again at 75. At the crosses, our favorite trade is short NZD against other cyclical currency pairs. These include the CAD, AUD, and SEK. Sterling is selling off as we anticipated, but our timing was offside. That said, the pound is cheap. We will go long cable if it falls below 1.25. Short EUR/GBP at current levels. The Swiss franc will continue to appreciate versus the USD, but will lag behind the euro. EUR/CHF will touch 1.15. We prefer the JPY to the CHF as a currency portfolio hedge. We argued last week that Prime Minster Shinzo Abe’s resignation does not change the yen’s outlook. Feature Our trade basket this year has been centered on a dollar-bearish theme. Since the top in the DXY index on March 19th, we have been expressing this view via various vehicles, most of which have been very profitable. Our favorites have been the Scandinavian currencies, silver, and the AUD, either at the crosses or against the US dollar. So far, these are among the best-performing trades in the G10 currency world (Chart I-1). Chart I-1A Currency Report Card Going into the final leg of 2020, the key question is which currency pairs will provide the most upside. In this report, we revisit the rationale behind our high-conviction trades. The Case For Scandinavian Currencies A review of Q2 GDP across the G10 reveals which countries have been doing relatively better during the pandemic. Norway emerges as the economy that had the best quarter-on-quarter annualized growth (Chart I-2). Swedish growth held up very well in Q1 and even the drop in Q2 still puts it well ahead of the US, the euro area, and the UK. As small, open economies which are very sensitive to global growth conditions, this is a very impressive feat for Sweden and Norway. Part of the reason for this is that over the years, the drop in their currencies, both against the US dollar and euro, has made them very competitive. Chart I-2A Currency Report Card Norway benefited from a few things during the pandemic. First, as a major oil exporter, the sharp fall in the NOK helped cushion the domestic economy against the crash in crude prices. Second, the handling of the pandemic was swift and rigorous, and this has almost completely purged the number of new infections in Norway. Third, aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus (zero rates, quantitative easing, and the first budget deficit in 40 years) has set the economy on a recovery path. As a result, consumption is rebounding smartly and the Norges Bank expects mainland GDP to touch pre-crisis levels by 2023. Already, real retail sales have exploded higher (Chart I-3). Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks (and value stocks in general) could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Norwegian Consumption Has##br##Recovered Chart I-4A Bounce In Oil & Gas Stocks Will Help The Krone In the case of Sweden, the sharp rebound in the manufacturing PMI also suggests the industrial base is recovering. This will also coincide with a solid bounce in exports, cementing Sweden’s rise in relative competitiveness and its exit from the pandemic-induced recession (Chart I-5). The Riksbank’s resource utilization indicator has stabilized, suggesting deflationary pressures are abating. Meanwhile, home prices are on the cusp of a recovery, which should help boost consumer confidence and support consumption. With our models showing the Swedish krona as undervalued by 19% versus the USD, there is much room for currency appreciation before financial conditions tighten significantly. Should global growth continue to rebound, a reversal in pessimism towards energy stocks could see investors reprice the Norwegian stock market (and krone) sharply higher. The bottom line is that both Norway and Sweden are well poised to benefit from a global economic recovery, with much undervalued currencies that will bolster their basic balances. We expect both the SEK and NOK to be the best performers versus the USD in the coming year (Chart I-6).  Chart I-5The Swedish Economy Is On The Mend Chart I-6The Scandinavian Currencies Remain Cheap Stay Long Precious Metals, Especially Silver In a world of ample liquidity and a falling US dollar, gold and precious metals are bound to benefit. This is especially the case on the back of a central bank that is trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. Gold has a long-standing relationship with negative interest rates, though the correlation has shifted over time. The intuition behind falling real rates and rising gold prices is that low rates reduce the opportunity cost of holding non-income-generating assets such as gold. But more importantly, the correlation is between the rise in gold prices and the level of real interest rates, meaning as long as the latter stays negative, it is sufficient to sustain the gold bull market (Chart I-7). Gold tends to be a “Giffen good,” meaning demand increases as prices rise. This can be seen in the tight correlation between our financial demand indicator (proxied by open futures interest on the Comex and ETF holdings, Chart I-8) and gold prices. The conclusion is that, just like the US dollar, gold tends to be a momentum asset, where higher prices beget more demand – at least until the catalyst of easy money and negative rates vanishes Chart I-7Gold Prices And Real Yields Chart I-8Gold Is A Giffen Good There is reason to believe that the bull market in gold might be sustained for longer this time around. The reason is that central banks have become important (and price-insensitive) buyers. Foreign central banks have been amassing almost all of the gold annual output in recent years. It is remarkable that for most of the dollar bull market this past decade, the world’s major central banks (and biggest holders of US Treasurys) have seen rather stable exchange rates relative to the gold price (Chart I-9). This suggests that gold price risks could be asymmetric to the upside. A fall in prices encourages accumulation by EM central banks as a way to diversify out of their dollar reserves, while a rise in prices encourages financial demand and boosts the value of gold foreign exchange reserves. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. While we like gold, more value can be found in silver (and even platinum) prices, which have lagged the run up in gold. During precious metals bull markets, prices tend to move in sequence, starting with gold, then silver. Meanwhile, the gold/silver ratio (GSR) tends to track the US dollar (Chart I-10), since silver tends to rise and fall more explosively than gold. Part of the reason is that the silver market is thinner and more volatile. Silver’s rising industrial use has also led to competition with investment demand in recent years. Chart I-9Central Banks Will Put A Floor Under Gold Prices Chart I-10Silver Should Outperform Gold As The Dollar Falls The next important technical level for silver will be the 2012 highs near $35/oz. After this, silver could take out its 2011 highs that were close to $50/oz, just as gold did. Globally, the world produces much more gold than silver, with a supply ratio that is 7:1. Meanwhile, the price ratio between gold and silver is near 70:1. Back in the 1800s, Isaac Newton concluded that the appropriate ratio was 15.5:1. We initially shorted the GSR at 100 and eventually took 25% profits when our rolling stop was triggered. We recommend putting a limit sell at 75. More speculative investors can buy silver outright. Stay Short NZD At The Crosses, Especially Versus The CAD Chart I-11Stay Long CAD/NZD In our currency portfolio, trades at the crosses are equally important as versus the USD in terms of adding alpha. Over the past year, we have successfully been playing the short side of the kiwi trade. We closed our long SEK/NZD trade for a profit of 7.8% on March 20, and our long AUD/NZD trade for a profit of 5.2% on June 26. Today, we remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. First, the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the G10, while Canadian bourses are heavy in cyclical stocks. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD cross. Second, immigration was an important source of labor for New Zealand, and COVID-19 has eaten into this dividend for the economy. As such, the neutral rate of interest is bound to head lower. And finally, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy will fare better than agriculture, boosting Canada’s relative terms of trade. At the Bank of Canada’s meeting this past Wednesday, the tone was slightly optimistic as it kept rates on hold. Recent data has been rather strong in Canada, especially in housing and goods consumption. This allows for the possibility of the BoC tapering asset purchases faster than the market expects, as argued by my colleague Mathieu Savary. This arbitrage is already being reflected in real interest rates, where they offer a premium of 180 basis points in Canada relative to New Zealand (Chart I-11). What To Do About Sterling? Trade negotiations between the UK and EU are once again hitting a brick wall. The key issue is around Northern Ireland. Ireland wants to remain bound to the EU’s customs and trade regime. The UK is seeking an amendment to be able to intervene, if there is “inconsistency or incompatibility with international or domestic law.” In short, it allows for UK discretion in the movement of goods to and from Northern Ireland, as well as state aid to Northern Ireland. The EU argues this is a clear breach of the treaty agreed to last year.    We remain bullish on the CAD/NZD as an exploitable trading opportunity. As negotiations go on, our base case is that a deal will eventually be reached. This is because neither side wants the worst-case scenario, namely, a no-deal Brexit. Should no deal be reached, the sharp rise in the trade-weighted euro will be exacerbated by a drop in the pound. This is deflationary for the euro area. And while the drop in the pound could be beneficial to the UK in the longer term, it will be very destabilizing since the UK is highly dependent on capital flows. Our roadmap for sterling is as follows: Historically, odds of a “hard” Brexit have usually been associated with cable near 1.20. This occurred after the UK referendum in 2016 and after Prime Minister Boris Johnson was elected with a mandate to take the UK out of the EU (Chart I-12). Intuitively, this suggests that maximum pessimism on the pound, driven by Brexit fears, pins cable at around 1.20. A “weak” deal cobbled together at the eleventh hour will still benefit cable. Depending on the details, 1.35-1.40 for cable will be within striking distance. In the case where both the UK and EU come to a “perfect” agreement, the pound could be 20%-25% higher. The real effective exchange rate for the pound is now lower than where it was after the UK exited the ERM in 1992, with a drawdown that has been similar in size. A good deal should cause the pound to overshoot the mid-point of its historical real effective exchange rate range (Chart I-13). Chart I-12GBP Has Historically Bottomed At 1.20 Chart I-13The Pound Is Cheap The pound is also cheap versus the euro, and we expect the EUR/GBP to start facing significant headwinds near 0.92. It is remarkable that UK data continues to outperform both the US and euro area (Chart I-14). As such, cable should be bought on weakness. Tactically, we would be buyers of the pound in the 1.24-1.25 zone, and our limit sell on EUR/GBP was triggered yesterday at 0.92.   Chart I-14The UK Economy Is Improving Thoughts On The ECB The main takeaways from the European Central Bank (ECB) conference were threefold. First, data in the euro area was better than the ECB expected. Second, the ECB did not give any hints on its policy review or extend forward guidance. Keeping policy easy until inflation is up to, but still below, 2% appears more hawkish than the Federal Reserve, which is now trying to asymmetrically generate inflation. And finally, the ECB said they are monitoring the exchange rate, but fell short of providing any hints that they will actively lean against the currency. The euro took off, both against the dollar and other European currencies. We outlined in last week’s report why we do not believe the euro can fall much from current levels. These include the common currency being cheap and having a large share of exports in the eurozone. A Few Words On The CHF Finally, a few clients have asked what happens to the Swiss franc in an environment where the euro is rising (and the dollar is falling). Our bias is that the Swiss National Bank lets a rising EUR/CHF ease financial conditions in Switzerland, and even leans into it. The Swiss National Bank has been stepping up its pace of intervention since EUR/CHF touched 1.05 this year and will continue to do so (Chart I-15). Unfortunately, there is not much it can do about a falling USD/CHF. This suggests the franc will fall against the euro, but not so much against the dollar. In a world where global yields eventually converge to zero, holding the Swiss franc is an attractive hedge. Chart I-15USD Weakness Will Be A Headache For The SNB   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data from the US have been positive: On the labor market front, nonfarm payrolls fell to 1371K from 1734K in August. The average hourly earnings increased by 4.7% year-on-year. The unemployment rate declined from 10.2% to 8.4%. Initial jobless claims increased by 884K for the week ending on September 4th.  Finally, the NFIB business optimism index increased from 98.8 to 100.2 in August. The DXY index initially rose to a 4-week high of 93.6 earlier this week with positive data releases, then fell back to 93. Our bias is that while the dollar has been rebounding since the beginning of the month, the rally could prove to be a healthy counter-trend move in the long-term dollar bear market. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 A Simple Framework For Currencies - July 17, 2020 DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data from the euro area have been mixed: The Sentix investor confidence increased from -13.4 to -8 in September. GDP plunged by 11.8% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, or 14.7% year-on-year.  The euro declined by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The ECB decided to keep its interest rate and PEPP program unchanged on this Thursday. President Christine Lagarde sounded quite hawkish in the press conference, saying that incoming data since the last monetary policy meeting suggest “a strong rebound in activity broadly in line with previous expectations.” We continue to favor the euro against the US dollar. Report Links: Addressing Client Questions - September 4, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data from Japan have been mixed: The coincident index increased from 74.4 to 76.2 in July. The leading economic index also climbed up from 83.8 to 86.9 in July. The current account balance widened from ¥167 billion to ¥1,468 billion in July. GDP plunged by 7.9% quarter-on-quarter in Q2, or 28.1% on an annualized basis. Preliminary machine tool orders continued to fall by 23.3% year-on-year in August. Overall household spending contracted by 7.6% year-on-year in July. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The expansion in Japan’s current account balance is mainly driven by the decline in domestic demand. Exports fell by 19.2% year-on-year in July while imports slumped at a faster pace by 22.3%. This suggests that deflationary forces are returning to Japan, which will boost real rates and buffet the yen. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data from the UK have been mostly positive: Retail sales continued to increase, rising by 4.7% year-on-year in August, following a 4.3% increase the previous month. Halifax house prices increased by 5.2% year-on-year for the 3 months to August. The Markit construction PMI declined from 58.1 to 54.6 in August. The British pound extended its sell-off this week, depreciating by 2.5% against the US dollar, making it the worst-performing G10 currency. Under ongoing trade negotiations, the possibility of a no-deal Brexit is now putting more downward pressure on the pound after the summer rally. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data from Australia have been mixed: The AiG services performance index fell from 44 to 42.5 in August. The NAB business confidence increased from -14 to -8 in August while the business conditions index fell from 0 to -6. The Australian dollar appreciated by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. Spending fell sharply during the pandemic, pushing Australia’s savings rate to 19.8% from 6%. Until consumer spending returns in earnest, the RBA is unlikely to raise rates, which puts a cap on how far the AUD can rise. The good news is that household balance sheets are being mended, which reduces macroeconomic risk. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data from New Zealand have been mixed: Manufacturing sales plunged by 12.2% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. The preliminary ANZ business confidence index increased from -41.8% to -26% in September. The ANZ activity outlook index also ticked up from -17.5% to -9.9%. The New Zealand dollar fell initially against the US dollar, then recovered, returning flat this week. The ANZ New Zealand Business Outlook shows that most activity indicators have increased to the highest levels since the beginning of the pandemic but are still well below pre-COVID-19 levels. We like the New Zealand dollar against the US dollar but believe that it will underperform against other pro-cyclical currencies including the Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data from Canada have been positive: On the labor market front, the unemployment rate declined from 10.9% to 10.2% in August. The participation rate increased from 64.3% to 64.6%. Average hourly wages surged by 6% year-on-year in August. Housing starts increased by 6.9% month-on-month to 262.4K in August, the highest reading since 2007. The Canadian dollar depreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The Bank of Canada maintained its target rate at 0.25% on Wednesday. It is also continuing large-scale asset purchases of at least C$5 billion per week of government bonds. Moreover, the Bank suggested that the bounce-back in activity in Q3 was better than expected, which bodes well for the loonie. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data from Switzerland have been mixed: FX reserves continued to increase from CHF 847 billion to CHF 848 billion in August. The unemployment rate remained unchanged at 3.4% in August. The Swiss franc appreciated by 1% against the US dollar this week. The SNB Chairman Thomas Jordan said that “stronger currency market interventions relieve over-valuation pressure on the Swiss franc and protect the Swiss economy”. Recent dollar weakness could be another headache for the SNB, accelerating SNB’s currency intervention. While we like the franc as a safe-haven hedge with high real rates, the upside potential is likely to be more gradual as the SNB leans against it. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data from Norway have been positive: Manufacturing output increased by 1.8% month-on-month in July. Headline consumer price inflation ticked up from 1.3% to 1.7% year-on-year in August. Core inflation continued rising to 3.7% year-on-year from 3.5% the previous month. The Norwegian krone depreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. The increase in headline inflation was mainly driven by furnishings and household equipment (10%), communications (4.9%) and food (3.7%). However, the Norwegian krone is still tremendously undervalued against the US dollar according to our models. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been mostly positive: The current account surplus fell to SEK 63.2 billion in Q2 from SEK 75.5 billion in Q1. However, this compares favorably to a surplus of SEK 34.7 billion the same quarter last year. Manufacturing new orders continued to fall by 6.4% year-on-year in July. This is an improvement compared to the 13.1% contraction the previous month. Headline consumer prices inflation increased from 0.5% to 0.8% year-on-year in August. Core inflation also climbed up from 0.5% to 0.7% year-on-year. The Swedish krona appreciated by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. We continue to favor the Swedish krona amid global economy recovery. Moreover, our PPP model shows that the krona is still undervalued by 19% against the US dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights The dollar has entered a structural bear market but is at risk of a countertrend bounce.  The catalyst for such a bounce will be the underperformance of G10 economies, specifically the euro area relative to the US. The immediate trigger is a renewed surge in infections in the euro area. Eventually, in a post-COVID-19 world, the structural growth rate of the euro area should improve relative to the US. The Federal Reserve’s resolve to allow for an inflation overshoot will amplify the global supply of dollars. This will lead to a self-reinforcing spiral of better global growth, and a weaker dollar. Emerging market currencies have underperformed the drop in the dollar but will play catch up. We continue to recommend a three-pronged strategy for playing dollar shorts: Hold Scandinavian currencies, precious metals (especially silver and platinum), and the Japanese yen as insurance. We were stopped out of our tactical short GBP position. Stand aside for now. Our FX model remains dollar bearish and is recommending shorting the DXY for the month of September. Feature August is seasonally a strong month for the dollar (and other safe-haven currencies, for that matter), but this year bucked that trend. Despite the DXY index punching below key support levels since the March highs and becoming very oversold, the downtrend continued in August unabated. Technically, it suggests that the forces against the US dollar are quite powerful. Our trade basket has benefitted tremendously from the drop in the dollar this year, and we continue to advocate short dollar positions over a 12-month horizon. That said, we had tried playing a tactical bounce in the DXY via a short GBP position last month and got stopped out. September remains a seasonally weak month for the pound, but the dollar also tends to be weak against most other procyclical currencies (Chart I-1). As such, our bias is that while the dollar is due for a countertrend bounce, it might not be a playable one. Technical indicators also suggest that the dollar is likely to consolidate losses in the weeks ahead.  Technical indicators also suggest that the dollar is likely to consolidate losses in the weeks ahead. Our intermediate-term indicator is oversold, and speculators are quite short the cross (Chart I-2). However, any bounce should be used as an opportunity to establish fresh short positions, as the DXY is likely to punch below 90 by year end. Chart I-1September Is A Good Month For Dollar Shorts Chart I-2Rising Number Of ##br##Dollar Bears What Are The Catalysts For A Countertrend Bounce? While the dollar has entered a structural bear market, two catalysts are lining up which could trigger a countertrend bounce: The Eurozone, which was well into its reopening phase, has been hit hard by a second wave of COVID-19. Meanwhile, new infections in the US have started to flatten out (Chart I-3). As a result, economic momentum, which was higher outside the US, has rolled over. Improving relative economic performance between the US and other G10 countries could be a key catalyst behind dollar strength (Chart I-4). It is true that the number of new deaths in both France and Spain remain low compared to the surge in the number of new cases. But, while it might ease draconian government lockdowns, citizens are likely to have concerns and may pay heed to the potential of being infected (and dying). This could slow economic activity. Chart I-3US Cases Are ##br##Flattening Chart I-4Economic Momentum Rolling Over Outside The US The US stock market is overstretched and is at risk of a more significant correction in the near term, which could introduce some volatility in global bourses and buffet the dollar. The fall in the DXY has been a mirror image of the rise in the S&P 500 (Chart I-5). Renewed geopolitical tensions between China and the US as well as the upcoming US presidential election are sources of risk, and a catalyst to hedge short positions. Historically, the dollar has tended to rise with both increasing equity and geopolitical risk premia. This is the benefit of being a reserve currency. Chart I-5The Dollar & S&P 500 In a nutshell, the US economy had been relatively weak compared to the rest of the world. Tentative August data is showing that this trend may now be reversing. While one cannot use one data point to extrapolate a trend, it is worth monitoring. What Does The Federal Reserve Shift Mean For The Dollar? Beyond a countertrend rally, the balance of forces are still stacked against the US dollar. The Fed’s pivot to target average inflation will only accentuate these forces. In a special report this week, our fixed income strategists outlined the major takeaways from the Fed’s policy shift.1 In a nutshell, the Fed will now allow for an inflation overshoot on a going-forward basis. Part of the reason the US dollar outperformed from 2011 on was because economic growth was relatively better, which allowed interest rates to be higher. With economic growth in the US held hostage by the pandemic, the Fed has been forced to drop rates to zero, effectively wiping out the nominal US interest rate advantage (Chart I-6). The fall in the DXY has been a mirror image of the rise in the S&P 500. Going forward, we know two things. First, the Fed (or any other central bank for that matter) will not raise rates anytime soon. But more importantly, the Fed has telegraphed that they will allow for an inflation overshoot. This means that real rates in the US are bound to become even more negative. It is impressive that countries like Switzerland and Japan, with negative policy rates, have much higher real rates than the US today (Chart I-7). This does not bode well for the dollar. Chart I-6Interest Rates In The US Have Collapsed Chart I-7Real Yields Could Be Lowest In The US Has The Euro Rallied Too Fast? The rise in the euro has certainly stirred discussion among policymakers and investors, with some commentators pointing to some measures of the trade-weighted currency being near record highs. While the euro certainly has scope to correct towards the 1.15-1.16 level, this should be used to accumulate long positions. In our view, there is little indication that currency strength is becoming a headwind for the economy. Indeed: The euro area continues to sport a very healthy trade and current account surplus, a sign that the euro remains very competitive among its trading partners (Chart I-8). This is remarkable in a world of slowing global trade. Correspondingly, the euro still remains 12% undervalued against our fair value purchasing power parity (PPP) models (Chart I-9) Chart I-8Is This An Expensive Currency? Chart I-9The Euro Is Cheap Much ink is being spilled over the fact that headline inflation in the euro area fell below zero for the first time since 2016. Quickly forgotten is that a fall in inflation actually increases the fair value of the currency in a PPP framework. It also makes European goods more competitive. In the long term, that could be the difference between whether foreigners buy Cadillacs or BMWs. The structural appreciation in the trade-weighted Swiss franc is a case in point. As intra-European trade represents a large share of cross-border transactions, currency considerations become more of a moot point. In 2019, most member states had a share of intra-EU exports of between 50% and 75% (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Europe Exports A Lot To Europe Going forward, an agreement on the mutualization of European debt means we can begin to expect more synchronized business cycles as fiscal stabilizers kick in.2  The reality is much more complicated, of course, but the biggest roadblock to mutualized debt (which is that it could never happen) has been toppled. This will allow the neutral rate of interest in the euro area to head higher (Chart I-11). The reason is that both fiscal and monetary policy can now be synchronized across member states: Chart I-11Can Euro Area Growth Accelerate? The European Central Bank and European Commission have successfully lowered the cost of capital in the euro area, probably well below the return on capital. With Italian and Spanish bond yields now collapsing towards those in the core, liquidity is flowing to where it is most needed, significantly curtailing euro break-up risk. Social distancing might remain in place for a while, meaning services will suffer more than manufacturing. More importantly, a huge proportion of the service sectors in the euro area is tied to tourism (Chart I-12), while it remains domestic in places like the US. So, as the tourism season wanes and we get into the winter months where social distancing is all the more important, the underlying trend growth in manufacturing could be higher. A more drawn-out services recovery raises the prospect that countries geared more towards manufacturing such as Europe, Japan and China, could experience better growth (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Tourism Is Important For Europe Chart I-13Higher Service Share In The US This will occur at a time when European equities, especially those in the periphery, are very cheap. Part of the reason is that most Eurozone bourses are heavy in cyclical stocks that are well into a 10-year relative bear market.3 A re-rating of cyclical stocks, especially banks and energy, relative to defensives could be the catalyst that carries the next leg of the euro rally. This could push the EUR/USD towards 1.25. Does Abe’s Resignation Change The Yen’s Outlook? Chart I-14More Jobs, More Savings Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s health has pushed him to resign from office. The front runner from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Yoshihide Suga, is likely to be his successor. Suga-san has publicly said he would like to continue with “Abenomics” and even enhance it. As such, the status-quo is more likely than a draconian policy change, as argued by our geopolitical colleagues.4 That said, there is a narrative floating around that he could be more of a fiscal hawk. Our belief is that economic forces are usually more powerful than political ones over the long term. And the economic force holding Japan hostage right now is the real threat of a deflationary spiral, which will send the yen higher and lead into a negative self-reinforcing feedback loop. Japanese companies certainly do not appreciate an excessively stronger yen, due to negative translation effects on profits. And neither does the Japanese government, since it is deflationary, and high government debt levels cannot be inflated away. With Japan having one of the highest real rates in the G10 right now, Suga-san’s more moderate fiscal stance might be overcome by a powerful deflationary wave in Japan. It is remarkable that while Japan had been able to keep a lid on the pandemic, it did see a short resurgence of new cases. That has since subsided, but it remains a clear reminder to the public that going out to spend money is risky business. As a result, the worker’s saving ratio continues to surge as unemployment rises and consumer confidence drops (Chart I-14). This is a trend any politician will find very difficult to ignore. As Suga-san stumbles to establish his stance, the yen could rise. Emerging market (EM) currencies such as the BRL, ZAR, INR, or even until recently the CNY, have lagged behind the drop in the DXY index. As we outlined in our weekly report in June, we remain yen bulls.5 This view rests on three pillars. First, Japan has one of the highest real rates in the G10, meaning outflows from Japanese fixed income investors will fall. Second, the yen is very cheap relative to the US dollar. And finally, during dollar bear markets, the yen more often than not outperforms the USD. This suggests holding a long yen position is a “heads I win, tails I do not lose much” proposition. EM Currencies Have Underperformed, Why? A lot of skepticism on the dollar rally has centered on the fact that emerging market (EM) currencies such as the BRL, ZAR, INR, or even until recently the CNY, have lagged behind the drop in the DXY index (Chart I-15). While this has been a historically rare event, so has the pandemic. As a result, we have witnessed a few economic shifts: Chart I-15EM Currencies Are Lagging Since 2014-2015, central banks have been aggressively trying to diversify out of dollar reserves. Unfortunately for most currencies, their alternative has been other safe-haven assets such as gold and the yen. IMF reserve data show that both the yen and gold have borne the brunt of dollar diversification. This trend has been supercharged in 2020, with the addition of the euro (Chart I-16). To put this in perspective, Russia now over 24% of its FX reserves in gold versus under 3% in 2008. Russia has very little dollar reserves. China has risen from less than half a percentage point of gold reserves in 2008 to over 3%. Imagine if China were to shift half of its gargantuan Treasury holdings into alternative assets? The perfect “robust” portfolio in simple terms has been a 60/40 one: 60% in equities, 40% in bonds. This has delivered low volatility and exceptional returns. But with government fixed income rates near zero, managers are now looking for alternatives. Gold and precious metals look like a perfect candidate in a world where central banks want to asymmetrically generate inflation (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Diversification Out Of Dollars Into Gold Chart I-17Would You Bet On US Bonds Or Gold At Zero Rates?     The pandemic raged in a lot of EM countries while it was falling in DM. This has weakened EM fundamentals relative to their developed-market peers. The EM Markit PMI index has been falling sharply relative to that in the US, a sea-change from what we saw earlier this year (Chart I-18). As a result, many EM central banks have aggressively cut rates, narrowing interest rate differentials with the US. In their latest report, our emerging market colleagues contend that EM fundamentals remain poor, but could improve Chart I-18EM Relative Growth Relapsing EM currencies have a lot going for them. First, some are extremely cheap by historical standards. This should greatly help ease financial conditions. Second, our technical indicator shows that the dollar decline is becoming a lot more broad-based at the margin (Chart I-19). The percentage of countries with rising exchange rates versus the dollar has surged. Within EM, we continue to favor precious metal producers (in line with our BCA Research bullish precious metals view) and oil producers, versus a basket of oil consumers. Chart I-19Dollar Drawdown More Widespread The Message From Our Trading Model Our FX trading model remains bearish on the US dollar for the month of September. It has upgraded Australia and Norway, while downgrading New Zealand (Chart I-20). The white paper for the model can be found here. Chart I-20AModel Recommendations For September Chart I-20BModel Recommendations For September Our bias, however, is that the dollar is due for a tactical bounce. We tried to implement this via a short GBP position but were thrown offside. So far, the UK PMI continues to outperform both that of the US and the euro area, suggesting the UK economy has been relatively more resilient to the pandemic. As such, we prefer to tighten stops on our profitable trades as a way to manage risk.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "A New Dawn For US Monetary Policy", dated September 1, 2020. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "EUR/USD And The Neutral Rate Of Interest", dated June 14, 2019. 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Currencies And The Value-Vs Growth Debate", dated July 10, 2020. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Abenomics Will Smell As Sweet By Any Other Name", dated September 4, 2020. 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "An Update On The Yen", dated June 12, 2020. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US has been solid: The Markit manufacturing PMI rose from 50.9 to 53.1 in August. The ISM manufacturing PMI also climbed from 54.2 to 56, expanding for a fourth straight month. Notably, the ISM new orders index soared from 61.5 to 67.6. The goods trade deficit widened to $79.32 billion from $70.99 billion in July. Initial jobless claims decreased to 881K for the week ending August 28th. The DXY index recovered by 1% this week, supported by promising PMI releases. In the long run however, our bias is that the USD might be on the verge of a long bear market. Diminished advantage of interest rate differentials, higher twin deficits and negative sentiment all point to a lower dollar going forward. Report Links: A Simple Framework For Currencies - July 17, 2020 DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 Cycles And The US Dollar - May 15, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been negative: The Markit manufacturing PMI remained flat at 51.7 in August while the services PMI fell from 54 to 50.5. Headline consumer price inflation fell from 0.4% to -0.2% year-on-year in August. Headline inflation sank from 1.2% to 0.4%. Moreover, producer prices decreased by 3.3% year-on-year in July. The unemployment rate ticked up from 7.7% to 7.9% in July. The euro fell by 1.2% against the US dollar this week. The negative inflation rate raises questions about ECB’s baseline inflation scenario and inflation forecasts, putting more pressure on the ECB to adopt a more dovish stance ahead of the monetary policy meeting next week.  Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mostly negative: The manufacturing PMI increased from 45.2 to 47.2 in August, while the services PMI slipped to 45 from 45.4. Retail trade fell by 2.8% year-on-year in July, following a 1.3% decline the previous month. Moreover, industrial production plunged by 16.1% year-on-year in July after an 18.2% decrease in June.  Construction orders fell by 22.9% year-on-year in July. Housing starts also plunged by 11.4%. The jobs-to-applicants ratio fell from 1.11 to 1.08 in July. The unemployment rate increased from 2.8% to 2.9%. The Japanese yen remained flat against the US dollar this week. We continue to favor the Japanese yen as fears grow for a second wave of COVID-19. Moreover, Japan now sports the second highest real interest rates in the G10 universe. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: The manufacturing PMI rose to a 30-month high of 55.2 in August from 53.3 in July. The services PMI also increased to 58.8 from 56.5 the previous month. Mortgage approvals increased by 66.3K in July, up from 39.9K in June. Housing prices grew by 3.7% year-on-year in August. The British pound appreciated by 0.9% against the US dollar this week. While the latest PMI release showed fast expansion in the manufacturing sector for the month of August, the employment outlook remained unfavorable. Moreover, COVID-19 and Brexit uncertainties remain headwinds for the British pound. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly negative: GDP slumped by 7% quarter-on-quarter in Q2, the worst figure on record, confirming the nation’s first recession in almost 30 years. The commonwealth manufacturing PMI increased from 48.8 to 49.4 in August. Exports tumbled by 4% month-on-month while imports surged by 7% monthly in July. The trade surplus shrank by A$3.6 billion to A$4.6 billion. Building permits increased by 6.3% year-on-year in July, following a 15.8% contraction the previous month. AUD/USD fell by 1.6% this week. The RBA left its interest rate unchanged at 0.25% on Tuesday. However, it has increased the size of the term funding facility and extended the banks’ access to low-cost funding through the end of June 2021. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The ANZ business confidence index increased marginally from -42.4 to -41.8 in August, while the activity outlook index slipped from -17 to -17.5. Building permits fell by 4.5% month-on-month in July. The goods terms of trade index rose by 2.5% quarter-on-quarter in Q2. The New Zealand dollar depreciated by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. In the Wellington speech this Wednesday, RBNZ Governor Adrian Orr said that “We strongly believe that the best contribution we can make to our monetary and financial stability mandates is ensuring we head off unnecessarily low inflation or deflation, and high and persistent unemployment”, suggesting a more dovish stance in the coming monetary policy reviews. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mostly negative: Annualized GDP slumped by 38.7% quarter-on-quarter in Q2.  The manufacturing PMI rose to 55.1 in August from 52.9 the previous month. Building permits fell by 3% month-on-month in July. Exports rose to C$45.4 billion from C$40.9 billion in July. Imports also increased to C$47.9 billion from C$42.5 billion. The trade deficit widened by C$0.9 billion to C$2.5 billion. The Canadian dollar depreciated by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. The contraction in Q2 GDP is more than twice as bad as the lowest point reached during the GFC. On the positive side, the June monthly GDP increase of 6.5%, compared with the previous month, is showing signs of recovery with the easing of COVID-19 restrictions at the end of Q2. Report Links: Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mixed: The KOF leading indicator surged from 86 to 110.2 in August. Real retail sales increased by 4.1% year-on-year in July. The manufacturing PMI increased from 49.2 to 51.8 in August. Headline consumer prices remained in deflation territory at -0.9% year-on-year in August. The Swiss franc remained flat against the US dollar this week. The SNB Governing Board Member Andrea Maechler said on Tuesday that negative interest rates are “extremely important” for Switzerland. Being deeply in deflation for seven consecutive months, Switzerland now sports the highest real rate in G10.   Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been negative: The current account surplus narrowed to NOK 20.5 billion in Q2 from NOK 27 billion in the same quarter last year, the smallest surplus since the fourth quarter of 2017. The Norwegian krone depreciated by 2.2% against the US dollar this week, making it the worst-performing G10 currency. That said, we remain positive on the Norwegian krone. Our FX model indicator for the NOK increased from 1 to 2 for the month of September, signaling a strong buy for the currency and pushing the sentiment component up from neutral to long. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar -  January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mixed: GDP fell by 7.7% year-on-year in Q2, or 8.3% quarter-on-quarter, the steepest contraction on record. The manufacturing PMI increased from 51.4 to 53.4 in August, the fourth consecutive month of manufacturing expansion. The new orders index surged from 52.2 to 56. The Swedish krona fell by 1.1% against the US dollar this week. As one of the most pro-cyclical currencies, the Swedish krona will benefit the most from the global business cycle recovery. Moreover, the SEK is still trading at a tremendous discount against its fair value, as compared to the US dollar. We continue to overweight the Nordic basket to both USD and EUR but are tightening the stop loss this week amidst potential market volatilities. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Abenomics was working – prior to trade war and COVID-19 – and it will remain Japan’s economic policy setting, albeit in a new guise. This is true even if a dark horse candidate wins the Liberal Democratic Party’s leadership race. Japan’s strategic alliance with the United States is based on a shared interest to balance China’s rise and will not change regardless of the 2020 and 2021 elections. Abe failed to make peace with Russia, but Russo-Japanese relations remain the bellwether of a revolution in Russian policy toward China. We are far from that now. Stay long JPY-USD. The yen’s safe haven properties will buoy it during the coming three-to-six months of extreme political risk. The dollar is set to fall in the medium term due to US debt monetization, twin deficits, and global growth recovery. Feature Japanese equities have rallied despite trailing their American and global counterparts (Chart 1). Yet the good news for markets is now coinciding with the emergence of political uncertainty, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, now the longest-serving in Japan’s history, announced he will step down due to illness. Abe’s departure marks the end of a chapter in the country’s modern history and raises questions about the future of “Abenomics,” the eponymous economic policy consisting of ultra-dovish monetary policy, accommodative fiscal policy, and neoliberal structural reforms aimed at lifting productivity and growth. Chart 1Japan's Rally Trails Global Counterparts Chart 2… As Longest-Serving Prime Minister Steps Down Japanese leaders rarely last as long as Abe so the market will likely have to familiarize itself with more churn in top-level government policies going forward (Chart 2). But will the churn change the secular direction? No. Abenomics: A Concise Post-Mortem Chart 3Population And Workforce Decline The driver of Abenomics was not Abe, or his central bank Governor Haruhiko Kuroda, or even the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party. It was geopolitics – an accumulation of social, political, economic, and strategic pressures demanding that the ruling elite shake up decades-long policies in pursuit of the national interest. Everyone knows that Japan’s population is aging and shrinking, but the key to understanding the Abe era is the recognition that the 2008 global financial crisis coincided almost exactly with the peak in Japan’s total population. This came 18 years after the working age population’s peak in the very year of Japan’s own financial crisis (Chart 3). The first crisis triggered Japan’s slide into price deflation; the second crisis threatened the permanent entrenchment of deflation along with a series of existential threats to the wellbeing of the nation. The driver of Abenomics was geopolitics, not Abe. First came global recession in 2008. Next the institutional ruling party – Liberal Democrats – fell from power for the first substantial period of time in modern memory in 2009. Then China fully emerged as a great power, brandishing its new foreign policy assertiveness and igniting a maritime-territorial clash and minor trade war from 2010 (Chart 4). Japan’s decline reached its nadir with a literal nuclear meltdown, following the devastating Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in 2011. The country’s strategic import dependency combined its ongoing financial instability, as shuttered nuclear plants required a surge in high-priced energy imports that wiped away Japan’s all-important current account surplus (Chart 5). Chart 4Geopolitical Status Anxiety Chart 5Nuclear Meltdown And Resource Anxiety The Liberal Democrats returned to power in a sweeping election victory after this ill-fated experiment with opposition rule. Party leader Shinzo Abe was relatively popular and willing to oversee a drastic overhaul of stale policies. Abenomics was never going to solve all of Japan’s deep structural challenges – population decline, massive debt, overregulation, lifetime employment. But its critics failed to recognize that the country had hit rock-bottom and policymakers had no choice but to stimulate, reform, and open up the economy. Otherwise they would go straight back into the political wilderness at the next election.1 Abenomics was about as successful as an overhyped political policy program can be: The economic boom drew in workers from all parts of society, particularly women, whose participation rate soared (Chart 6). Abe flung open the doors to immigration in a traditionally xenophobic country, attracting Chinese, Vietnamese, and Filipinos to live and work in Japan (Chart 7). Chart 6Abe Got People To Work Chart 7Abe Broke The Taboo On Immigration Kuroda at the Bank of Japan flew into action with aggressive asset purchases, triggering a sharp devaluation of the yen (Chart 8). Nominal GDP growth and core CPI trends both improved, critical to easing debt burdens, lowering real rates, stimulating economic activity, and shaking off the deflationary mindset (Chart 9). Chart 8Abe Kicked The BoJ Into Action Chart 9Abe Combatted Deflation Stagnant wages finally started to grow, with an extremely tight labor market (Chart 10). This was all the more remarkable due to the simultaneous surge in foreign workers. Corporate investment stabilized and turned upward, finally overcoming the long decline since 1990 (Chart 11). Chart 10Wage Growth Improved (Until Trade War, Pandemic) Chart 11Abe Revived Corporate Investment Abe also opened the door to foreign trade, taking on powerful vested interests, including his own party’s base, to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) along with the United States in a bid to create an advanced new trade framework that sidestepped China. Chart 12Abe Opened The Doors, A Bonus With Or Without Trade War When US President Donald Trump pulled out of the bloc in accordance with his protectionist campaign promises, Abe led the charge in preserving it. Japan stands to benefit from opening up these markets whether the US-China trade war continues or not (Chart 12). This was generally effective leadership, but none of it happened by sheer force of personality. It happened because Japan glimpsed the specter of national failure in 2011 under the combined weight of internal malaise and external domination. Economic revival was as much about shoring up Japan’s national security as it was about improving Japanese lives and livelihoods. Abenomics was the economic component of a broader national revival. The goal was to become a “normal” nation, capable of self-defense and independent policy, and a pro-active world power at that. China’s rise and a distracted US will pressure Japan to maintain Abe’s policies. The drivers of Japan’s political earthquake in 2011 are not spent. COVID-19 dashed many of Abe’s gains in the fight against deflation. China’s rise is a greater challenge than ever before. The US is even more divided and distracted. The next prime minister would not be able to change course even if he wanted to do so. Suganomics, Kishidanomics … Ishibanomics? Chart 13Still No Alternative To Institutional Ruling Party The Liberal Democrats and their longtime coalition partners, New Komeito, have not only lost about 5% of popular support since their triumphant comeback in 2012, standing at 40% support today – and with some improvement since 2017. More importantly, their nearest rivals all poll under 5% of the popular vote (Chart 13). There is no political competition as yet. The ruling party will choose a new leader with little fanfare. Abe’s Chief Cabinet Secretary and chosen successor Yoshihide Suga is the frontrunner as we go to press. Political uncertainty, such as it is in Japan, will emerge ahead of the September 2021 election. Abe’s retirement and the aftermath of the global recession create an opening for disgruntled factions and opposition parties to challenge the ruling party. It will not succeed but it will portend a less predictable period in the absence of a unifying figure like Abe. In fact, Abe’s influence peaked in July 2019 when he lost a single-party super-majority in the House of Councillors, the upper house of parliament (Chart 14). The 2021 election now raises the prospect of additional erosion of support. Chart 14US-Japan Alliance Versus China Will Persist Opposition is particularly likely if Suga attempts to achieve Abe’s major unfinished task: the revision of Article Nine of the constitution to countenance Japan’s de facto armed forces and right to self-defense. At very least Suga will mark the return of the “revolving door,” in which weak prime ministers come and go in rapid succession. The top candidates for the leadership race lack differentiation: the leading contenders are dovish on monetary and fiscal policy, hawkish on national security and foreign policy, just like Shinzo Abe (Table 1). The exception is former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, but a close examination of his statements and actions suggests that he does not pose a real risk to the policy status quo (Box 1 at bottom). Should Ishiba rise to power, now or later, we would be buyers of any risk premium in financial markets on his account. Table 1The Return Of The Revolving Door The prime minister over the 2021-22 period will have the occasion to appoint up to four members of the Bank of Japan’s Policy Board (Table 2). Theoretically, the appointment of neutral or less dovish candidates could lead to a 5-4 majority on the board by 2023. But this is very unlikely. Table 2Dovish BoJ Is Here To Stay First, it would require all vacant seats to be filled with members who hold hawkish views, which would mark a sharp departure from the current thinking both within the BoJ and the LDP. Second, Kuroda is still governor and could hold that post until 2028. Third, Japan’s economic demands will still require easy monetary policy, as the population will still be shrinking and the country’s vast debt pile will remain a burden. Fiscal austerity is impossible. There is no reason to expect Abe’s successors to be fiscal hawks either. Abe proved to be more of a hawk than expected, by going forward with statutory increases to the consumption tax rate. These are now complete, at 10%, with no future tax hikes scheduled. If Abe managed to create small positive surprises in fiscal thrust throughout his term despite this effort at fiscal consolidation, then his successor should be able to do so in the wake of COVID-19 without any consolidation as yet on the books (Chart 15). Chart 15Despite Mistakes, Fiscal Thrust Surprised To Upside Chart 16Fiscal Austerity Impossible Fiscal austerity is impossible as nearly 60% of the budget is dedicated to social spending for the graying and shrinking society as well as interest payments on the national debt – leaders will continue to avail themselves of the ancient imperial practice of tokusei, or debt forgiveness, rather than draconian spending cuts or tax increases that would drag down the economy and hence increase the debt even faster (Chart 16). Of course, the major failure of Abenomics will still dog Abe’s successors over the long run: the inability to lift Japanese productivity. Despite Abe’s attempts to shake up the labor market, spark corporate investment, reform corporate governance, and open up the economy to foreign trade, productivity has still declined, underperforming both the EU and the UK (Chart 17). Japan will continue to depend heavily on foreign demand, especially Chinese demand. In the short term this is positive, since China’s deleveraging campaign and the COVID-19 shock are giving way to another major bout of Chinese fiscal and credit stimulus. China will be forced to keep stimulating to cope with its secular slowdown and manufacturing dislocation. Japan is still a cyclical economy and stands to benefit (Chart 18). Chart 17No Quick Fix For Poor Productivity Chart 18Chinese Stimulus Will Be Steady In the long run, however, Japan’s future darkens considerably when its own demographic decline and deflationary tendencies are coupled with China’s inheritance of these same trends. The Communist Party is doubling down on import substitution and foreign policy assertiveness, ensuring that trade and strategic conflict with the US will escalate over time. Japan will remain allied with the United States, out of its own strategic interest, but will pay the price in periodic headwinds to growth. Its ability to relocate manufacturing to Japan is limited in all but the most sophisticated of industries. It will have to embrace ever more unorthodox monetary and fiscal policy while investing heavily in new technologies and emerging markets ex-China in search of growth. Geopolitically speaking, Shinzo Abe helped the United States formulate its new strategic plan of promoting a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and the spirit of this policy will outlive Abe and President Trump. The US’s “pivot to Asia” began under the Democratic Party, which will rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership, with a few tweaks, if it returns to power. The US and Japan are both interested in forming a grand coalition of nations surrounding China to contain its ambitions, whether military, political, or technological. China would be naïve not to see the quadrilateral security dialogue between these countries and India and Australia as the blueprint of a naval alliance designed to contain it. The Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Seas, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the Korean Peninsula will become the sites of “proxy battles” as the US and Japan strive to contain China. Japan will retain its safe haven status – in both the geopolitical and financial sense – while other countries will see a higher geopolitical risk premium. Japanese and Korean trade tensions will persist, unless the US takes a leadership role in strengthening the trilateral relationship. Russia has chosen to throw in its lot with China, which will not change anytime soon. But if Abe’s successor is able to get peace negotiations back on track, in pursuit of another of Abe’s major unfinished initiatives, then this would serve as an important bellwether of Russia’s own fear of China’s growing power. Investment Takeaways Chart 19Japanese Stocks Look Attractive... Japanese equities are exceedingly cheap and hence attractive over the long run, given that a new global business cycle is beginning and governments around the world are committed to providing as much support as they are able. At a dividend yield of less than 2.5%, the real return on Japanese stocks over the next ten years could be 20% (Chart 19). However, over the next three-to-six months, the world faces extreme uncertainty over the US election and rapidly deteriorating US-China relations. The Japanese economy is slowing and monetary policy, at the zero lower bound, will play a marginal role. The yen is set to appreciate as a safe-haven in this environment (Chart 20), and until there is a total divergence of the inverse correlation of the yen and Japanese equities, the latter will struggle to outperform those of other developed markets on a sustained basis. Chart 20... But Yen Rally Will Continue Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Box 1: Ishiba Is Not A Real Risk To The Policy Status Quo Shigeru Ishiba, while not favored to succeed Abe in the short run, is a compelling Japanese politician and one of the few Liberal Democratic leadership candidates who would mark a change with Abe, as Table 1 above indicates. If Ishiba looks to become prime minister, now or later, he would create some financial market jitters primarily because he would not symbolize seamless policy continuity. He is a major rival of Abe and has publicly criticized Abenomics, including in his 2018 book.2 He is reputed to be a hawk on monetary and fiscal policy. However, a close look at his record shows that he is not ideological and would not revolutionize Japanese national policy once in office. Ishiba is a careful and rational thinker and an institutional and establishment LDP politician. Both Ishiba and his father (Jiro Ishiba) were scions of the Tanaka/Takeshita factions whose base was agriculture, construction industry, defense industry, and the postal service.3 His is not the background of a radical fiscal hawk. One of Ishiba’s major concerns is generating growth outside of the major cities, but he does not take a slash and burn approach to the central government budget. For example, at a forum on Abenomics, the director of the Japanese Civilization Institute spoke with Ishiba in his capacity as Minister of Regional Revitalization. The moderator gave Ishiba the opportunity to denounce excess government spending and promote central spending cuts, saying, “Maybe you must arrange fiscal discipline more appropriately. Then, you can supply that money to regional areas.” Ishiba responded drily, “But I think regional areas must make their own money too.” The yen could rally on a bout of political uncertainty if Ishiba at any time looks likely to become LDP leader and he criticizes excessively easy economic policies. But, as we noted above in the report above, the BoJ Policy Board, not the prime minister’s office, will set monetary policy – and Ishiba would struggle to stack the board with hawks due to institutional resistance. Moreover in the wake of a global recession, the next prime minister will not have much ability to drive parliament into budget cuts or tax hikes. Ishiba would more likely seek to pursue deregulation. If he insisted on austerity, the economy would slump and his premiership would be ruined. Chances are he would listen to his advisers. The one policy that concerns Ishiba above all is national defense and security. Ishiba previously served as defense minister and was known for his hawkish tone, particularly over disputes in the East China Sea and domestic protests against the country’s new security law. More recently he differed with Abe’s constitutional revision – not over the need to normalize Japan’s self-defense forces, but because Abe tried to avoid an explicit mention of Japan’s right to maintain armed forces. If anything, Ishiba would be inclined to increase military spending. Yet his foreign policy is not a risk to the markets, beyond rhetoric, as he is also more willing to engage China than some other LDP leaders. Footnotes 1 In truth, something of a national awakening had already begun in the early 2000s under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. This is reflected in the improvement of the fertility rate from 2005. But it fell to Abe to pick up where Koizumi had left off, fighting deflation and strengthening Japan’s international position. 2 See "Abe’s rival to declare bid to become Japan’s next leader," Nikkei, July 13, 2018, asia.nikkei.com. See a campaign synopsis at ishiba.com. 3 See Jojin V. John, "Developments in Japanese Politics: LDP Presidential Election and the Future of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe," Indian Council of World Affairs, August 29, 2018, icwa.in